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Shakespeare vs. Seneca: Competing Visions of Human Dignity 
 
Patrick Gray 
 
Critical examination of the possibility that Senecan tragedy influenced Shakespeare has moved 
through several distinct phases. Early interest in verbal parallels and analogous literary 
conventions met with resistance from critics such as G. K. Hunter who sought to emphasize 
Shakespeare’s debt to medieval English drama, rather than classical Latin precedent. More recent 
scholarship, however, such as that of Robert S. Miola tends to present Shakespeare as well-
versed in Senecan tragedy. Critics such as Gordon Braden, A. J. Boyle, and Colin Burrow, as 
well as Miola, have assembled illuminating studies of local allusions to Seneca’s tragedies in 
specific plays. Most studies of Shakespeare’s reception of Seneca tend to remain somewhat 
superficial, however, engaged with a myriad of discrete formal details, rather than diving deeper 
into more synthetic, probing questions of meaning, values, and worldview. How is Shakespeare 
the thinker responding to Seneca the thinker? I argue here that the most important distinction 
between the two playwrights is a difference of opinion about human dignity. Shakespeare’s 
Christian sensibility leads him to undermine and overturn Seneca’s more typically classical sense 
of human grandeur.
1
 
The study of Shakespeare’s reception of Seneca began in earnest at the turn of the 
twentieth century. John Cunliffe assembled enthusiastic, somewhat undigested lists of verbal 
parallels between Senecan drama and Elizabethan tragedy. Not long after, Henry B. Charlton and 
F. L. Lucas made some effort to integrate and expand upon this initiative, identifying formal 
                                      
1
 Auerbach argues that the advent of Christianity unsettled and ultimately dispelled long-standing classical 
assumptions about human dignity and literary decorum. See, e.g. Auerbach 2003, 39-40 on humilis. For Auerbach 
on Shakespeare, see the “The Weary Prince” (2003, 312-33). 
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conventions which Elizabethan dramatists seem to borrow from Seneca.
2
 The most influential 
author in this regard, however, was T. S. Eliot. Eliot contributed a sympathetic introduction to a 
reprint of Thomas Newton’s Tenne Tragedies, where he defended the value of these early 
English translations as poetry.
3
 He also drew attention to the possibility of a connection between 
Seneca and Shakespeare in an address at the Shakespeare Association in London, later published 
as an essay, “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca.” 
 A look at a few instances quickly shows the attraction of comparing specific passages, as 
well as some of the potential difficulties. Two quotations from Seneca’s Hippolytus appear in 
Latin in Shakespeare’s early revenge play, Titus Andronicus. When Titus learns that his 
daughter, Lavinia, was raped by Chiron and Demetrius, he speaks out angrily against what he 
sees as the injustice of the gods, that the two men should remain alive. “Magni dominator poli / 
Tam lentus audis scelera, tam lentus vides?” (“O ruler of the great heaven, / how are you so slow 
to hear crimes, so slow to see them?” ) (4.1.81-82). The outburst combines Pha. 671-72 with Ep. 
107.11, suggesting an imperfectly-remembered commonplace. Earlier in the play Demetrius, 
consumed with lust for Lavinia, describes himself as in hell: “per Stygia, per manes vehor” (“I 
am carried through the region of [the river] Styx, through [the realm of the] shades,” (1.1.635). 
This line simplifies and slightly mangles Pha. 1180, “per Styga, per amnes igneos amens 
sequar” (“I [Phaedra] will madly follow you [Hippolytus] through Styx, through fiery rivers”).4 
Unfortunately, however, for those who would see an open-and-shut case for Senecan influence, 
both of these Latin quotations appear in sections of the play which some critics ascribe to a 
collaborator, George Peele, rather than to Shakespeare himself.
5
  
                                      
2
 For a thorough list of these conventions, see Miola 1992, 3. 
3
 See Eliot 1950.  
4
 For further discussion of these parallels, see Miola 1992, 13-15 as well as Burrow 2013, 183. 
5
 See Jackson 1979, 148-58 and Vickers 2002, 148-243, esp. 179. 
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 Aside from Titus Andronicus, the two plays that have attracted the most attention from 
critics looking for the influence of Senecan tragedy are Macbeth and King Lear. Macbeth’s 
hesitation to kill King Duncan, torn as he is between pity and ambition, plays out in soliloquies 
that recall not only Hamlet, as well as Brutus, but also Senecan antiheroes such as Medea, 
Clytemnestra, and Aegisthus.
6
 King Lear ends in a startling affront to theodicy, the death of 
Lear’s innocent daughter, Cordelia, and contains passages that recall the frequent complaints 
about the cruelty and injustice of the gods that can be found throughout Seneca’s tragedies.7 “As 
flies to wanton boys are we to th’ gods. / They kill us for their sport” (4.1.38-39). Macbeth’s 
famous soliloquy, “Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,” evokes an analogous sense of 
nihilism and despair.
8
 Turning to specific passages, it is easy to multiply instances of striking 
parallels. Macbeth’s conceit that his blood-stained hand will turn the sea red recalls Hippolytus’s 
lament that the entire ocean could not cleanse him of the shame of Phaedra’s proposition.9 Lear’s 
vow to do “such things,” he knows not what, “but they shall be / The terrors of the earth” 
(2.4.280-82), recalls Atreus’s ominous vow that his revenge will be nescioquid animo maius et 
solito amplius (“something greater, larger than usual, beyond human limits,” ) (267). 
Nailing down a case for immediate influence can be difficult, however. For instance, 
Cunliffe finds an echo of Seneca’s Agamemnon in Shakespeare’s Macbeth. As he plots to kill 
Banquo, Macbeth justifies his decision with a Senecan argument: “things bad begun make strong 
themselves by ill” (3.2.56). The line seems, at least, to allude to a turning point in one of 
                                      
6
 Med. 25-27, 40-43, 893-994; Thy. 176-204, 283-84, 324; Ag. 49-52, 108-15, 198-202, 228-43. See Belsey 1973 
and Boyle 1997, 181-82 on dubitatio.  
7
 Cp. Pha. 959-88, 1238-43, 1271-72; Oed. 75, 667, 1042; Med. 29, 439-40, 1026-27; Tro. 51-57, 351-69, 524, 528, 
743-44, 763, 768-79, 981-90, 1056; Thy. 122-35, 407, 1006-21, 1092-102; Phoen. 243-51; Her. O. 205-53, 299-302, 
519, 645-46, 850-64. See Rosenmeyer 1989, 183 on what he calls Senecan Schreirede, “the heightened speech 
whereby the character (or the chorister) deflects his glance from his own person and frantically looks for sympathy 
in the presumptively ‘sympathetic’ universe.”  
8
 Shakespeare, Macbeth, 5.5.19-28. 
9
 Shakespeare, Macbeth, 2.2.58-62; cp. Pha. 715-18. 
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Clytemnestra’s soliloquies, as she stiffens her resolve to kill her returning husband: per scelera 
semper sceleribus tutum est iter (“The safe way for crimes is always through crimes,.” ) (115). 
Cunliffe acknowledges, however, that variations on this aphorism also appear in numerous other 
contemporary plays, including Marston’s Malcontent, Webster’s White Devil, and Jonson’s 
Catiline.
10
 As Jessica Winston has explained in the previous chapter, Senecan tragedy was so 
popular in Elizabethan England that Thomas Nashe could poke fun at the trend, accusing 
playwrights of copying Seneca “line by line and page by page.” As a result, it is difficult to 
discern whether Shakespeare encountered Senecan tragedy directly or indirectly.  
Even if Shakespeare did read Seneca’s plays, another further question still remains. Did 
he read them in Latin, or in English translation? Gordon Braden dismisses the fourteener verse of 
the Newton translations as “numbing” and “infuriating.” The idea that they might have inspired 
Shakespeare seems to him inconceivable. “We have at present no strong reason to think that they 
will ever be established as significant influences in the development of Elizabethan poetry, 
dramatic or otherwise” (Braden 1985, 173).11 On the opposite side of the debate, Reuben Brower 
finds it “unlikely and beyond proof” that Shakespeare himself ever “read the full text in Latin of 
any play by Seneca.” Instead, he argues, “the translators will be our surest guide” (1971, 148-
49). M. L. Stapleton acknowledges that scholars tend to “betray embarrassment at what they 
perceive as bad poetry, bad playwriting, bad translation” (2000, 17). Nevertheless, he argues, 
“the Newtonians serve as our invaluable guides for Shakespeare’s Senecan explorations, 
excavations, and conquests” (22).  
Probably the best evidence for Shakespeare’s familiarity with the 1581 translations is that 
he seems to parody them in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, in the repertoire of the “rude 
                                      
10
 Cunliffe (1893, 24-5). 
11
 Hunter is even more caustic. “It is a pity that the supposed historical significance of the 1581 volume has caused it 
to be twice reissued [i.e. in 1927 and 1964].”  (1967, 194). 
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mechanicals.”12 As Colin Burrow explains, the language of these mid-century Tudor translations 
“would have sounded slightly ‘antiqued’ even at the time of their composition” (2013, 172). By 
the turn of the century, however, as Shakespeare began writing, their prosody would have 
seemed downright laughably outmoded. Bottom proudly attests that he could “play Ercles 
rarely,” then declaims a few lines, as a taster. (1.2.31-8): 
 
The raging rocks 
And shivering shocks 
Shall break the locks 
Of prison-gates; 
And Phibbus’ car 
Shall shine from far 
And make and mar 
  The foolish fates. (1.2.31-8) 
 
This spoof recalls two passages from John Studley’s translation of Hercules Oetaeus.13 
“Phibbus’ car” appears in the opening two lines, Sator deorum, cuius excussum manu / utraeque 
Phoebi sentient fulmen domus (“Sire of the gods, whose hand launches the thunderbolts felt by 
both homes of Phoebus…”), which Studley translates, “O LORDE of Ghostes whose fyrye 
flashe (that forth thy hand doth shake) / Doth cause the trembling Lodges twain of Phoebus car 
to quake…”14 “Raging rocks” that “break the locks” appear in Deianira’s nurse’s boast about the 
scope of her magic powers, habuere motum saxa, discussi fores / umbrasque Ditis (“rocks have 
                                      
12
 See Engel (1903) and Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, ed. Brooks (1979, lxii-lxiii, 139-45). 
13
 See Koeppel (1911, 190-91) and Miola (1992, 181 n. 8). 
14
 Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus, trans. Studley, 2: 193; cp. Her. O. 1-2. 
Formatted: Indent: Left:  1.27 cm
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started to move; I have shattered the doors and darkness of Dis”), which Studley renders as “the 
roring rocks have quaking sturd, and none thereat hath pusht. / Hell gloummy gates I have brast 
oape.”15 Shakespeare combines the first two lines of Studley’s translation, as if to signal his 
source, with a bit from the interior appropriate to the speaker in question: Bottom. Like 
Deianira’s nurse, Bottom is a lower-class character, claiming unusual power. He is attempting to 
help, in this case, Peter Quince with his casting decision, and, as with Deianira and her nurse, his 
solicitous attention does more harm than good. M. L. Stapleton argues that Bottom’s lines as 
Pyramus, as well, echo Alexander Neville’s translation of Seneca’s Oedipus (2000, 26). 
Searching for his beloved Thisbe, Pyramus bewails the obscurity of the encroaching darkness: 
“O grim-look’d night! O night with hue so black! / O night, which ever art, when day is not! / O 
night, o night! alack, alack, alack” (5.1.170-72). This bathetic lament resembles that of Neville’s 
Oedipus, as he curses the day: “O cursed fatall day, / O mischiefs great, O dreadfull times, O 
wretch, away, away.”16  
Stapleton argues further that Peter Quince’s painfully awkward prologue, “If we offend, 
it is with our good will,” etc., is intended as a parody of the Newton translators’ introductions 
(5.1. 108-17). “Their laborious prefaces contain the same curious fusion of defensive humility 
and apologetic pride” (2000, 24-25). Nor is Shakespeare’s mockery of these authors necessarily 
limited to A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Among several other, more minor instances, Robert 
Miola cites the example of the character Pistol, who appears in brief scenes scattered throughout 
Shakespeare’s second tetralogy of English history plays. “Pistol’s speech, a veritable catalogue 
of declamatory mannerisms, represents Shakespeare’s most obvious parody of Senecan style” 
(1992, 182). Miola also argues that Shakespeare’s critique of Senecan drama in A Midsummer 
                                      
15
 Ibid. 2: 210; cp. Her. O. 458-59. 
16
 Seneca, Oedipus, trans. Neville, 1:230. The line is interpolated into Oedipus’ final speech, 1042-61, without any 
clear-cut basis in the original Latin. 
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Night’s Dream extends beyond a simple send-up of an obsolete poetic style. “Both of Bottom’s 
impersonations – Ercles and Pyramus – focus ridicule on Senecan self-dramatization, on the 
habit of taking one’s self too seriously” (1992, 187). 
As Stapleton maintains, “parody is tribute” (2000, 26). Despite such evidence, however, 
towards the middle of the twentieth century, arguments for Seneca’s influence on Shakespeare 
began to meet with vehement objections. Whether Shakespeare’s exposure to Seneca was posited 
at first- or second-hand, in English or in Latin, claims about his reception of Senecan tragedy 
became targets for vociferous debunking. Willard Farnham and Howard Baker proposed that 
recurrent formal features such as tyrants, ghosts, and lurid violence might be more plausibly 
ascribed to the abiding influence of medieval English drama. In his monumental study of 
Elizabethan grammar school curricula, T. W. Baldwin found “no indication” that Shakespeare 
read Seneca in Latin, and no “evidence worth repeating” that he read Seneca in English, either 
(1944, 2:560).
17
 According to Baldwin, Shakespeare’s engagement with Senecan drama would 
not have been likely to have gone beyond schoolboy exercises, translating scattered sententiae.
18
 
If Shakespeare was aware of Senecan tragedy in any deeper sense, it was at most indirectly, 
through intermediaries such as fellow playwrights. Baldwin (1947) argued further that Terence, 
not Seneca, was the model for Shakespeare’s characteristic five-act structure.19  
The most categorical rejection of Seneca’s influence on Shakespeare, however, came 
from G. K. Hunter (1967; 1974; 1978, 159-73).
20
 Like Farnham and Baker, but with much more 
bite, Hunter argued that conventions in Elizabethan drama such as stichomythia which appear to 
be derived from Senecan tragedy can instead be better understood as a legacy of traditional 
                                      
17
 For a more recent analogue of Baldwin (1944), see Gillespie (2004). 
18
 Contrast Eliot (1934, 37): “I think it is quite likely that Shakespeare read some of Seneca’s tragedies at school.”  
19
 Baldwin, Five-Act Structure. 
20
 Cp. Bevington (1962). 
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English morality plays and mystery cycles. “If Seneca’s tragedies had not survived,” he writes, 
“some details would have had to be changed – but the overall picture [sc., of Elizabethan drama] 
would not have been altered” (1967, 21). In his summaries of extant debate, Frederick Kiefer 
(1978; 1983; 1985) is more moderate, but on balance tends to side with Hunter.
21
 Kiefer urges 
the reader to be careful to distinguish between likely sources for academic drama, written in neo-
Latin, and theatre such as Shakespeare’s which was written in English for a popular audience.22 
Seneca thus comes across as a rarefied taste; an obscure companion of the Latinate University 
Wits. 
 Subsequent scholarship continues to call into question the severity of this critical 
rejection.
23
 As Burrow explains, “there is an overwhelmingly strong prima facie case that 
Shakespeare read and was influenced by Seneca” (2013, 162). Reflecting on Baldwin’s account 
of Shakespeare’s education, Burrow concedes his argument about grammar school, but pushes 
back against his argument about Shakespeare. Surely Shakespeare’s “reading life,” he points out, 
did not end at fourteen. An argument based on school curricula has inherent limits. John Hazel 
Smith (1967) identifies fifty printings of Seneca’s tragedies before 1600. Bruce R. Smith (1978) 
catalogues thirty-seven translations of the plays into vernacular languages by the same date. 
“Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light” (2.2.401-2): when Shakespeare’s Polonius 
introduces a crew of traveling players as “the best actors in the world” (2.2.397), he cites Seneca 
as the most prestigious form of tragedy, the ne plus ultra of their art, and it seems unlikely that 
his opinion would have been altogether unconventional. Sir Philip Sidney, for instance, praises 
Gorboduc for “climbing to the height of Seneca his style” (1963, 38).  
                                      
21
 For other review essays, see Borgmeier (1978) and Frank (1997). 
22
 See Kiefer (1978, 18). On connections between Titus Andronicus and Cambridge productions of Senecan 
tragedies, see in contrast Smith (1988, 242-43). 
23
 See Miola (1992), Braden (1985, 171 ff.), and Martindale and Martindale (1990, 30-44). 
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In retrospect, the underlying premise of the Farnham-Baker-Hunter line of argument also 
seems questionable. Simply to find a possible alternative source for a given trope in Elizabethan 
tragedy is not an adequate argument against Seneca’s influence. Similar formal features can 
convey disparate sensibilities, depending on how they are used. Gordon Braden agrees with 
Hunter, for example, that passages akin to classical stichomythia can be found in medieval 
English plays. He also points out, however, that its instances in the English vernacular tradition 
feel very different from the intense verbal combat found in Seneca’s tragedies. Stichomythic 
interaction in Senecan drama has a distinctive tone: it serves as a power struggle, “a test of … 
self-possession” (1985, 181).24 Commenting on Baker’s criticism of Cunliffe, M. L. Stapleton 
observes what he calls a “troublesome fact” (2000, 29): although revenge can be found in 
medieval English drama, it is not an obsessive theme, the way it often is in Senecan tragedy; the 
emphasis lies elsewhere. Again, the feel, the import, of the material in question is very different.  
Nevertheless, as Burrow observes, scepticism about the influence of Senecan tragedy, 
conscious or unconscious, continues to pervade much of Shakespeare scholarship. “Editors of 
Shakespeare’s plays … have been astonishingly reluctant to discuss Seneca in their 
introductions, or to record even evident and well-established parallels in their notes” (2013, 163). 
Burrow is probably right to suspect two unjustified biases at work, resulting in this curious 
critical blindness: among Shakespeareans, an entrenched view of Shakespeare as an untutored, 
quintessentially English folk artist, ‘warbling his native woodnotes wild,’, and, among 
classicists, a longstanding prejudice against the aesthetics themselves of Senecan drama, as 
                                      
24
 Cp. Martindale and Martindale (1990, 31), as well as Boyle (1997, 163). 
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somehow inferior to Attic and Augustan precedent.
25
 Seneca is seen in comparison as too 
dissonant, garish, brutal, grotesque, hyperbolical, rhetorical, etc. 
Shakespeare and Seneca both operate outside neoclassical ideals of clarity, order, and 
decorum: Winckelmann’s edle Einfalt und stille Größe (“noble simplicity and quiet grandeur”). 
Shakespeare’s disorder, however, has long been represented as charming, naïve, and proto-
Romantic, whereas Seneca’s as a decline, a failure to live up to his classical predecessors. To 
posit Seneca as a source for Shakespeare, Shakespeare as embracing Silver Age Latin drama, 
disrupts this vision of literary history. Thus, perhaps, critics’ reluctance to look deeper into 
Shakespeare’s debt to Seneca. Happily, in recent years, the aesthetic merits of Senecan drama 
have come in for a reappraisal, at least among classicists.
26
 Nevertheless, among Shakespeareans, 
Seneca tTragicus remains at present still surprisingly unfamiliar: a vaguely disreputable, poorly 
understood figure. 
The reaction against early studies of Senecan influence did have some salutary effect, 
however, insofar as it prompted reconsideration of the methods themselves of source-study. Lists 
of comparable passages such as those compiled by Cunliffe, Charlton, and Lucas may be a useful 
starting point, but they are not on their own an adequate guide to the complex interaction 
between one author and another. Hunter is wrong to dismiss Seneca’s influence altogether, but 
he is right to want more than a bare list of parallels, and to suggest that studies of reception 
should consider the interaction between multiple texts and authors, rather than focusing on a 
single source in artificially-imposed isolation. The critics who then have best responded to this 
challenge are Gordon Braden and Robert Miola. Of these two, Braden is the more cohesive and 
                                      
25
 “Then to the well-trod stage anon, /If Jonsons learned Sock be on, / Or sweetest Shakespear fancies childe, 
Warble his native Wood-notes wilde[.]” Milton, “L’Allegro,” 131-34.  
26
 For further thoughts on the merits of Seneca’s aesthetic choices, see Boyle (1997, 15-31), as well as the sources 
listed in Stapleton (2000, 136 n. 36) and Burrow (2013, 274). 
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penetrating, but he omits Shakespeare almost entirely, in favour of a broader discussion of 
European Renaissance tragedy. Miola moves through Shakespeare’s works systematically, play-
by-play, identifying local allusions and adaptations of Senecan literary conventions. However, he 
tends to avoid large-scale, synthetic comparison of the two authors. In fact, Miola at times 
outright denies any systematic engagement between Shakespeare ‘the thinker’ and Seneca ‘the 
thinker.’27 “Shakespeare’s debt to Senecan drama,” he writes, “is principally a matter of style, a 
matter of rhetorical pose and gesture, replete with a cluster of familiar images and motifs” (1985, 
193).
28
  
Miola’s conclusions belie this statement: he depicts Shakespeare as fairly consistently 
rejecting what he calls the Senecan “style of selfhood” (1985, 193). Nevertheless, he does tend to 
emphasize small-scale questions of form. It seems likely, therefore, that the next step in the 
analysis of Seneca’s influence on Shakespeare will be the integration of these two approaches, 
Braden’s and Miola’s.29 Does Braden’s broad-strokes argument hold true for Shakespeare? As 
Braden maintains, “the more visibly Senecan features of Senecan rhetoric are not just a 
repertoire of varied effects, but have a corporate coherence as instruments of a particular style of 
selfhood; and at that level there is a serious affinity between Senecan tragedy and Renaissance 
tragedy” (1985, 66). 
What is needed, in other words, is a study of Shakespeare’s engagement with Senecan 
subjectivity. What vision of the world, of the self, does Senecan tragedy present? And how does 
Shakespeare respond to that vision? At the end of his seminal essay, “Shakespeare and the 
Stoicism of Seneca,” Eliot issues what amounts to a critical challenge. “The influence of Seneca 
                                      
27
 For Shakespeare as a “thinker,” see Nuttall (2007).  
28
 Cp. Emrys Jones (1977, 272) who suggests that “Shakespeare’s use of Seneca” is “more a matter of glancingly 
rapid effects than of a laborious working out of correspondences.” 
29
 See, e.g. Boyle (1997, 167-92) for an analysis of “ideological indebtedness” to Seneca in Renaissance tragedy in 
general, including Shakespeare. 
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on Elizabethan drama has been exhaustively studied in its formal aspect, and in the borrowing 
and adapting of phrases and situations; the penetration of Senecan sensibility would be much 
more difficult to trace” (1934, 53-54).” And in fact, turning back to Braden, perhaps the quickest 
way to understand his account of the influence of Seneca on Renaissance tragedy is to see it as 
precisely the project which Eliot imagines. Braden sets out to identify what, exactly, “Senecan 
sensibility” might be, and then to trace its “penetration” in Renaissance tragedy. 
Eliot begins by rejecting the idea that Shakespeare “deliberately took a ‘view of life’ 
from Seneca.” For purposes of comparison, he cites the example of Dante and St. Aquinas: 
Dante had “one coherent system of thought behind him,” “the system of St. Thomas, to which 
his poem corresponds point to point.” Not so Shakespeare; Seneca did not provide him with “a 
‘philosophy’.” What can be identified, however, as a legacy of Senecan tragedy is what Eliot 
calls “a new attitude,” “the attitude of self-dramatization assumed by some of Shakespeare’s 
heroes at moments of tragic intensity” (1934, 38). This “stoical attitude” is “the reverse of 
Christian humility,” and it “culminates,” as he sees it, in his own time, in “the attitude of 
Nietzsche.” It is “the refuge for the individual in an indifferent or hostile world too big for him” 
(1934, 47-48).  
As examples, Eliot cites various heroes in the plays of Marston and Chapman, as well as 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, Mark Antony, and Othello. He also singles out Othello for more 
detailed treatment. Confronted by an obvious error, his ill-considered murder of his own 
innocent wife, Othello adopts “an aesthetic rather than a moral attitude, dramatizing himself 
against his environment.” His focus is not on his victim, Desdemona, but instead on his own self-
esteem, his perception of his own dignity. “He takes in the spectator, but the human motive is 
primarily to take in himself.” In his final speech, Othello is not primarily, as he might seem, 
Gray -- 13 
 
acknowledging his own guilt, or even admitting his own human fallibility, but instead is 
“cheering himself up,” “endeavouring to escape reality” (1934, 39). He tries to re-embiggen 
himself; to see himself once again as powerful, god-like.
30
 Eliot sees this effort as “pathetic,” and 
he suggests that Shakespeare shares his perspective. “I do not believe that any writer has ever 
exposed this bovarysme, the human will to see things as they are not, as clearly as Shakespeare” 
(1934, 40). 
 Braden’s striking achievement is not only to develop this brief sketch of a Senecan 
“attitude” into a more fully developed account of Senecan “autarkic selfhood,” but also to 
explain its connection to Seneca’s philosophy. Braden proposes that the Stoic wise men such as 
Cato and Socrates whom Seneca exalts in his philosophical treatises and the furious, unrestrained 
avengers such as Medea and Thyestes whom he places at the heart of his tragedies are in fact 
variations on a single theme, θυμός, the competitive drive which St. Augustine criticizes as 
libido dominandi (“lust for dominance”), and Nietzsche celebrates as der Wille zur Macht (“the 
will to power”). Both types, the philosophical sage as well as the tragic antihero, strive to 
achieve what is, in the end, an unattainable fantasy: absolute, unquestioned, and unassailable 
personal autonomy, akin to that of a Roman emperor. They want to be, as Braden says, 
‘autarkic’: themselves (αὐτός) the origin (ἀρχή) of everything about themselves.31  
“Imperial aggression and Stoic retreat are both informed by a drive to keep the self’s 
boundaries under its own control … Stoicism is in this regard but the inner form of imperialism” 
(Braden 1985, 23). According to Braden, Stoicism is not the opposite of furor, but instead its 
“internalization”: “one manifestation of drives that, swerving in another direction, lead to the 
rage of Seneca’s madmen” (1985, 21). Thus it makes sense that Medea can adopt in earnest the 
                                      
30
 “A noble spirit embiggens the smallest man.” Springfield town motto, The Simpsons, Season 7, episode 16: “Lisa 
the Iconoclast.” 
31
 For the concept of “autarkic selfhood,” see Braden (1985, 2;, 303). 
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sententiae of a Stoic, or that Hamlet oscillates between “declamatory fury” and “relentless self-
laceration” (1985, 30). Brutus and Cleopatra only seem to be opposites; the Stoic and the femina 
furens are in fact two sides of the same coin, two versions of the same preoccupation: an 
obsession with personal honour. “Stoicism is the natural alternative to revenge because it is a 
twin endeavour, a complementary strategy for establishing the self’s belief in its own dignity and 
power” (1985, 218-19).32  
 In his discussion of Seneca’s influence on Shakespeare’s tragedies, Miola shows that this 
“passionate style of selfhood” leads to what he calls “grand, if solipsistic, apotheosis,” as well as 
“cosmic disaster” (1992, 193). A character such as Othello or Lear manages to see himself for a 
time as god-like, titanic, only to have that delusional sense of power prove false, in the end, as he 
confronts the unhappy consequences of his mistakes. Miola’s argument intersects here with 
Eliot’s, as well as Braden’s: the insatiable ambition of the “Senecan self” leads to what Eliot 
calls bovarysme, and Braden, “a fantasy of individual autonomy” (1985, 57). Reality will not 
accommodate the tragic protagonist’s sense of himself, so he opts instead for a different, more 
private reality, one in which he can be larger than life, even if only temporarily.
33
 Turning to 
Shakespeare’s last plays, Miola argues that these final tragicomedies present a deliberately 
opposed moral vision: “a change of heart, usually articulated as a repudiation of the Senecan 
self” (1992, 188). This “pivot” or “turning,” he adds, occurs in “a Christianized context of sin 
and repentance.” “Individual apotheosis gives way to humble contrition, tragic disaster to comic 
reconciliation” (1992, 193).34  
                                      
32
 See also Stapleton (2000) for Shakespeare’s engagement with the Senecan convention of the femina furens.  
33
 Cp. Bromwich (2010) on other tragic heroes in Shakespeare’s plays such as Macbeth and Lear tending, like 
Othello, towards what Eliot calls bovarysme: self-aggrandizing self-deception.  
34
 Cp. Boyle (1997, 173;, 179). 
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Braden for his part discerns a rejection of Seneca’s Weltanschauung even earlier in 
Shakespeare’s career, in Hamlet. Shakespeare introduces a new and alien element, Christianity, 
into the progress of a Senecan revenge plot, and well-nigh brings it to a crashing halt. Fear of 
guilt in the eyes of a Christian God prevents Hamlet from participating in the Senecan moral 
universe. “The prospect of Stoic withdrawal, no less than that of murderous action, spawns an 
unmanageable anxiety.” Hamlet is “excluded from the satisfactions of either revenge or Stoicism 
– and those satisfactions subtend a whole universe of human values” (1985, 220). In an essay on 
Thyestes and Hamlet, Eric Dodson-Robinson argues still more strongly for “a striking contrast 
between Seneca’s and Shakespeare’s dramatic visions”: “a programmatic challenge to the 
worldview and values of Senecan tragedy.” Both tragedies begin with something like original 
sin.
35
 In Seneca’s Thyestes, however, crime begets crime, without hope for improvement, 
whereas in Hamlet, Christian virtues enable some degree of redemption. “The brotherly 
forgiveness exchanged between Hamlet and Laertes inverts the dual prayers for vengeance 
uttered by Atreus and his brother at the conclusion of Thyestes.” 
 All of these critics’ conclusions suggest that further analysis of Shakespeare’s reception 
of Seneca will require making sense of what Dodson-Robinson identifies as “axiological” 
differences. Shakespeare and Seneca do not share the same values. Although they may use the 
same trope or dramatic convention, even the same phrase, their aesthetic choices are informed by 
different assumptions about morality, and this incongruity of sensibility can give their use of 
similar formal features a very different effect, in context. Another, more arresting way of making 
this basic point would be to say that Shakespeare and Seneca fundamentally disagree about the 
nature of human dignity, and that this disagreement affects their art. What is it about a human 
                                      
35
 Cfp. Gillies (2013) on original sin in Hamlet. 
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being that is or can be dignus, that is, worthy of approval? What qualities do we admire in 
ourselves, or in others?  
As Christopher Star explains, Seneca’s Stoicism was attractive to his contemporaries, as 
well as accessible, because he describes “personal imperium” metaphorically, in the familiar 
language of “military and political imperium,” but casts it as superior: more respectable and 
more desirable (2012, 23). Matthew Roller attributes this reorientation of aristocratic Roman 
ambition to a lack of opportunity within the Empire for more traditional advancement: “the 
unavailability of independent military commands for most aristocrats, along with the 
disappearance of concomitant military honors” (2001, 66).36 What is admirable, however, in 
Seneca’s thought is still, as it was for Nero, or for most other Romans, to be in control, in 
command. Self-rule is the imperative, the summum bonum. To be ‘autarkic’ is the aim: in the 
words of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, to “stand, / as if a man were author of himself” (5.3.35-36); 
even if that independence requires horrifying, pitiless cruelty; even if it means self-destruction.  
This vision of human dignity is precisely what Shakespeare sets out to upend. For 
Shakespeare, Seneca’s tendency to idealize untrammelled independence does not seem 
liberating, as it did to Marlowe or to Chapman, but instead tragically misleading. Human beings 
are naturally and inextricably dependent on each other; to attempt to stand apart from all others, 
like Coriolanus, “a lonely dragon” (3.3.30), is a doomed and even foolish enterprise. Characters 
such as Shylock or Malvolio who strive for imperious, pitiless control over others end up in 
situations that are not only unhappy, but also ignominious.
37
 They end up contemptible, weak, 
even laughable: from their perspective, an outcome very literally worse than death.
38
 In the 
                                      
36
 For similarities, in this respect, between Imperial Rome and Elizabethan England, see Rebhorn (1990). 
37
 See Boyle (1997, 183-84) on revenge backfiring in Renaissance adaptations of Medea and Thyestes. 
38
 Cleopatra and Brutus both kill themselves in order to avoid being led in triumph. 
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words of Alexander Pope, “there are some who would rather be wicked than ridiculous.”39 True 
dignity consists instead, paradoxically, in the deliberate recognition of human limitation. What 
Shakespeare admires is not brutal dominance, but instead what is aptly described in Christian 
theology as κένωσις (“self-emptying”): the voluntary surrender or delegation of individual 
agency.
40
 The height of human dignity, as Shakespeare sees it, is the power to relinquish power 
itself as an ethical aim; to give up the Senecan dream of self-mastery in the interests of a greater 
good: compassion.
41
 
In ancient Rome, dignitas was all but inseparable from social standing. In its most precise 
sense, dignitas denoted the potential to participate in the cursus honorum. It is the social capital, 
the broad-based approval, necessary in order to participate in Roman political life.
42
 Its sense is 
thus somewhat different from that of its English cognate, “dignity.” For example, authors such as 
Cicero, Quintilian, and Livy use the term dignitas not only to refer to a personal quality, but also 
as a synonym for high political office, or as short-hand for an office-holder himself, as in the 
English term, “dignitary.”43 Dignitas as an individual attribute is grounded, in the final analysis, 
in the ability to exercise political power. That is to say, in more direct language, what is 
admirable, dignus, in a human being is ultimately his capacity to command other people: to 
dominate them, master them, force them to his will. Other personal characteristics such as noble 
birth, martial prowess, and masculinity (virtus) are also worthy of respect, insofar as they enable 
this kind of imperium. But their value is secondary, instrumental. Qualities such as being male, 
                                      
39
 Letter to the Earl of Burlington, March 7, 1731. 
40
 See Phil. 2:5-11 for the New Testament touchstone of this aspect of Christian theology. 
41
 Seneca himself argues against misericordia in his essay De Clementia. 
42
 For further analysis, see Rosen (2012). The Roman sense that human worth depends on the ability to exercise 
some degree of political agency might well seem disturbing, in its implications. Are the powerless therefore 
worthless? Nevertheless, for classical authors, dignitas tends to be inseparable from political influence. See, e.g. 
Balsdon (1960) on the difficulty of reconciling dignitas with otium. 
43
 For instances, see dignitas in Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary. 
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high-born, wealthy, well-spoken, or successful in battle are all merely means to a more important 
end: relative goods, rather than absolute. What matters most , at the end of the day, is, instead, a 
more private, internal sense of individual agency. The aim above all, even the aim of political 
office itself, is to be able to see oneself as the agent, rather than the acted-upon; the doer, rather 
than the done-unto.  
Seneca’s ingenious breakthrough, both in his philosophy and in his tragedies, is to 
recognize that this characteristic Roman craving for individual control, the drive that St. 
Augustine calls libido dominandi, can conceivably be satisfied in other ways than the traditional 
patrician pursuit of high office at home and military conquest abroad. The desire to feel powerful 
can, he imagines, be fulfilled internally, without the perils and the complications of involving 
other people. imperare sibi, he writes, maximum imperium est (“To rule oneself is the greatest 
empire,” ) (Ep. 113.31). Under pressure from increasingly erratic and domineering Julio-
Claudian rule, Seneca found in Greek philosophy what must have felt like a welcome escape-
hatch. Hellenistic schools of thought such as Stoicism and Epicureanism provided a pressure 
release, an alternative to the intense, dog-eat-dog Roman world of competition for command 
over others.  
But is the autonomy that these systems promise truly attainable? In his essays and 
epistles, Seneca argues for the practicability of Hellenistic ethics, making few concessions. As 
proof of the possibility of radical self-control, he cites the example of historic figures such as 
Cato, Socrates, and the Greek philosopher Stilbo. He urges his correspondent, Lucilius, to retire 
from public affairs, in keeping with the precepts of Epicureanism. In his tragedies, however, 
writing about figures of Greek legend, Seneca gives much freer rein to his doubts. Self-possessed 
characters who maintain exemplary control over their own emotions seem few and far between. 
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As Phaedra complains, quid ratio possit? Vicit ac regnat furor (“What can reason do? Madness 
has conquered and rules me,” ) (184). When her attendant urges her to suppress her desire for her 
stepson, Phaedra replies point-blank, quae memores scio / vera esse, nutrix; sed furor cogit sequi 
/ peiora (“I know that what you say is true, nurse; but madness forces me to follow the worse 
path,” ) (177-79). Variations on this domina-nutrix debate occur in Medea and Agamemnon, as 
well as other tragedies: Jocasta with Oedipus in Oedipus, Ulysses with Andromache in 
Troades.
44
 Stoic suppression of the passions figures less as a lived philosophy than as a 
hypothetical foil; its maxims are articulated, but then disregarded as impracticable.
45
 
The manifest tension between Seneca’s tragedies and his professed philosophy has led 
over time to what Gregory Staley describes as “two schools of Senecan criticism: a moralistic 
school which assumes that the plays are a vehicle for Stoic teaching and a sceptical school which 
sees them instead as utterly unconcerned about morality or even hostile to it” (2010, 5). One 
especially prominent example of what Staley calls the “sceptical school” is Alessandro 
Schiesaro’s analysis of Thyestes, where Schiesaro argues that Atreus, the antagonist, “attracts the 
audience beyond and even against the purview of their ethical beliefs” (2006, 127).  “There can 
be no doubt,” he maintains, “where our aesthetic allegiances lie: with Atreus’ energetic poesis, 
his mastery of words and puns, his ruthless determination to plot, stage, and act his revenge” 
(2006, 122). He is “cunning, funny, articulate, simply irresistible” (2006, 117). Schiesaro 
compares Atreus to Aaron in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, in whom, citing Jonathan Bate, he 
discerns a similar “satanic drollery.”46 Like Atreus, Aaron is a “master of words” who becomes, 
                                      
44
 Pha. 100-357; Med. 150-6, 173-74, 381, 558-59; Ag. 125-43, 203, 225; cp. Oed. 81-86; Tro. 785-813; Phoen. 
347-49. 
45
 For further discussion, see Boyle (1997, 157-58) on “passion-restraint” scenes in Seneca and Shakespeare. 
46
 Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, ed. Bate, 11; cited in Schiesaro (2006, 111). 
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in effect, a playwright-within-a-play: he “engineers the larger part of the plot” and is “fully 
conscious of his metatheatrical role” (Schiesaro 2006, 72).  
Within Shakespeare studies, the best-known analogue of Schiesaro’s reading of Atreus is 
probably Stephen Greenblatt’s uneasy fascination with Iago in Renaissance Self-Fashioning. 
Much as Schiesaro with Atreus, Greenblatt sees in Iago an image of the playwright himself. “In 
Othello, Shakespeare seems to acknowledge, represent, and explore his affinity to the malicious 
improviser” (1980, 252). Shakespeare “possessed a limitless talent for entering into the 
consciousness of another” (1980, 252); so, too, Iago is “master of the vertiginous confounding of 
self and other” (1980, 229 n. 19). He is “demonically sensitive” (1980, 235), “an inventor of 
comic narrative” (1980, 234) capable of “brilliant improvisation” (1980, 246). “Iago is fully 
aware of himself as an improviser and revels in his ability to manipulate his victims” (1980, 
233). He is “linked to the playwright or at least to the Vice-like ‘presenter’ of a play” (1980, 298 
n. 16). Greenblatt is careful to maintain that “even in Othello, Iago is not the playwright’s only 
representation of himself” (1980, 252). Nevertheless, the line blurs. Over the course of 
Greenblatt’s account, Shakespeare and Iago become almost indistinguishable:  Shakespeare, like 
Iago, is “the supreme purveyor of ‘empathy’, the fashioner of narrative selves, the master 
improviser” (1980, 253). 
William Blake famously said of Milton that he was “of the Devil’s party without 
knowing it.” Reviving what he calls the “moralistic school” of Senecan criticism, Staley, 
however, strongly objects to this tendency, like Greenblatt, to identify, as Greenblatt does, an 
author with his most glamorous villain. Schiesaro, he protests, allows “Atreus ‘the playwright’ to 
define Seneca’s theory of tragedy.” “Would we allow Macbeth ‘the critic’ to interpret 
Shakespeare?” (2010, 120). Seneca in his account is more in control of his material than 
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Schiesaro suggests. “Whereas Schiesaro,” he explains, “sees Seneca’s plays as the mad poet’s 
dreams, I read them instead as the analyst’s interpretations” (2010, 8). Seneca’s tragedies are 
designed to illustrate the disastrous effects of unchecked emotion. “Seneca’s plays regularly 
depict characters who are angry, frightened, or even in love, for passion was the Stoic 
explanation for the events traditionally considered tragic” (2010, 7).47 Turning to Milton studies, 
an analogue of Staley’s reading of Senecan tragedy might be Stanley Fish’s response to Blake in 
Surprised by Sin. Milton’s ostensible sympathy for Satan early on in Paradise Lost is in fact a 
ruse. “The reader who falls before the lures of Satanic rhetoric displays again the weakness of 
Adam.” In leading the reader to recognize his own human “infirmity,” Milton aims to bring him 
“first to self-knowledge, and then to contrition” (Fish 1997, 38).   
Gordon Braden presents a more troubling synthesis. Seneca’s tragic villains, like Nero 
and Caligula, are not as different from his Stoic sapientes as either Schiesaro or Staley seem to 
imagine. “Both insist on absolute control; the one destroying whatever resists his conquest, the 
other surrendering all interest in whatever falls outside his power … Senecan tragedy, dominated 
by versions of these two postures, is an exploration of their common ground: the self which will 
not deal with external reality except on terms of utter dominance” (1984, 286). Atreus’s exultant 
revenge in Seneca’s Thyestes and Cato’s triumphant suicide in Seneca’s epistles are not 
altogether incongruent. Both express the same core desire for control; both are at once an 
ostensible self-apotheosis and an appalling self-annihilation. “Senecan tragedy is the tragedy of 
the success of the human drive for moral and personal self-sufficiency, the drive for an 
autonomous selfhood that is subject to no order beyond itself. At their most genuinely harrowing, 
Seneca’s tragedies reveal that very success as a kind of horror” (1984, 285). The recurrent 
                                      
47
 For a fascinating reading of Macbeth’s “brief candle” soliloquy, connecting it to a plausible Senecan source, 
Seneca’s discussion of hic humanae vitae mimus in Ep. 80.7, see Staley (2010, 9). Cfp. Bromwich (2010, 143-45) on 
Macbeth in this speech, like Eliot’s Othello, “cheering himself up.” 
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murder of children in Senecan tragedy, as in Macbeth, serves as a symbol of a “destructive 
cycle” which “spirals outward of its own logic to claim by the end something close to 
everything.”. Here, however, Braden draws an important distinction between Seneca and 
Shakespeare. Shakespeare, he maintains, is much more thoroughly sceptical about this ‘style of 
selfhood’: “much more profound and clearer” in showing its limits and drawbacks. “To master 
life this way is to empty it.” Senecan drama “never quite steps outside” its antiheroes’ all-
consuming “fantasies of vindictive fulfilment” (1984, 289). Shakespeare, in contrast, “never 
loses touch with the reality that ultimately resists and circumscribes any one man’s will” (1984, 
290). 
Like Seneca’s own tragedies, Shakespeare’s plays call into question Seneca’s philosophy, 
and by extension, the contemporary movement that he helped to inspire: Neostoicism. In Much 
Ado about Nothing, Leonato denounces the value of the conventional Stoic consolatio in no 
uncertain terms. “Cease thy counsel” (5.1.3), he tells Antonio, and again, “give me no counsel” 
(5.1.31). 
 
I pray thee peace, I will be flesh and blood; 
For there was never yet philosopher 
That could endure the toothache patiently, 
However they have writ the style of gods, 
And made a push at chance and sufferance. (5.1.34-38) 
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Leonato refuses to hear any such “preceptial medicine” (5.1.24), any talk of “patience” (5.1.10, 
19) unless the would-be “comforter” (5.1.6) has suffered, exactly as he has, the loss of a beloved 
child. 
 
 No, no; ‘tis all men’s office to speak patience 
  To those that wring under the load of sorrow 
  But no man’s virtue nor sufficiency 
  To be so moral when he shall endure 
  The like himself. Therefore give me no counsel[.] (5.1.27-31) 
 
The same insistence that “philosophy” is useless also appears in King John, when Constance 
believes that she has lost her son, Arthur. “Patience, good lady!” (3.3.22) King Philip exhorts 
her. “No,” she cries. “I defy all counsel” (3.3.23). Cardinal Panulph intervenes, and she changes 
tack. “Preach some philosophy,” she asks, “to make me mad” (3.3.51). 
 
  For not being mad but sensible of grief,  
My reasonable part produces reason,  
How I may be deliver’d of these woes, 
And teaches me to kill or hang myself. (3.3.53-6) 
 
This type of exchange appears in Romeo and Juliet, as well, when Romeo learns that he has been 
banished. “I’ll give thee armor to keep off that word,” Friar Laurence reassures him: 
“Adversity’s sweet milk, philosophy” (3.3.54-6). Romeo, however, is far from appeased. “Hang 
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up philosophy!” he cries. “Unless philosophy can make a Juliet, / Displant a town, reverse a 
prince’s doom, / It helps not, it prevails not; talk no more” (3.3.57-60).48 
 When achieved Stoicism does appear in Seneca’s tragedies, it is, as in his prose, in the 
form of a defiant, fearless death, showing no outward sign of pain or emotional distress. The 
most striking instance of such self-mastery occurs in the pseudo-Senecan Hercules Oetaeus, 
when Hercules helps to burn himself alive. Nullus erumpit sonus (“no sound burst from him”), 
Philoctetes recounts: o durum iecur! (“O tough heart!”) (1731-32). True to Seneca’s admiration 
of agency, the author emphasizes Hercules’s activity, even as he is consumed (1740-44):.  
 
inter vapores positus et flammae minas 
immotus, inconcussus, in neutrum latus 
correpta torquens membra adhortatur, monet,  
gerit aliquid ardens. omnibus fortem addidit 
animum ministris: urere ardentem putes. 
 
Enveloped by the heat and the menacing flames, yet unmoved, unshaken, not 
twisting onto either side with his burning limbs, he gave encouragement and 
counsel, and remained active, all ablaze. He strengthened the courage of all his 
attendants: you would think him burning while being burnt! (1740-4) 
  
Hercules’s dignity, represented here by his ascension to godhead, depends on his ability to 
remain powerful, in command, rather than a passive victim of the flames.
49
 A similar emphasis 
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 See also Bolingbroke’s response to John of Gaunt’s advice about his exile in Shakespeare, Richard II, 1.3.258-
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on individual agency can be seen in Seneca’s commentary on the suicides of Socrates and Cato 
the Younger in his essays and epistles, as well as his account of the executions of Astyanax and 
Polyxena in Troades. Astyanax superbit (“was fiercely proud,”) (1089); he mounts the wall 
intrepidus animo (“with a fearless spirit,” ) (1093). non flet e turba omnium / qui fletur (“Of the 
whole crowd, he did not weep who was wept for,”) (1099-1100). sponte desiluit sua (“He leapt 
down of his own accord,” ) (1102).  Polyxena likewise refuses to be cowed: audax virago non 
tulit retro gradum; / conversa ad ictum stat truci vultu ferox (“the dauntless heroine [lit., man-
like woman] did not step back; / she stood facing the blow, frowning defiance,” ) (1151-52). 
Even as she succumbs to a massive wound (vulnus ingens), she still finds a way to strike out at 
her enemy, Achilles. moriens adhuc / deponit animos: cecidit, ut Achilli gravem / factura terram, 
prona et irato impetu (“in dying she still maintained her pride: she fell, so as to make the earth 
heavy for Achilles, face downward and with angry force,” ) (1157-59). 
 Shakespeare’s Roman plays include several important suicides, all of which in some 
respect evoke this Senecan template. In each case, however, Shakespeare introduces some 
element, comic or ironic, which calls into question the ostensible dignity of the suicide. Antony 
in Antony and Cleopatra is the most obvious example. He asks his servant Eros to kill him, but 
his servant kills himself instead. He then falls on his own sword, but does not die straightaway. 
Nor like Cato does he then proceed to tear out his own innards.
50
 Instead, he begs his attendants 
to finish him off. However, they, too, refuse, like Eros. Finally he is taken to Cleopatra; he asks 
to speak, but she interrupts him, railing at Fortune. Although he boasts of conquering himself, he 
seems in practice very far from in command. His last line is, “I can no more” (4.15.61). Later, 
when Cleopatra, too, decides to kill herself, her high-flying appropriation of Stoic tropes, “Now I 
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 For Philoctetes’ complete description of Hercules’ death, see Her. O. 1693-1755. 
50
 Plut. Cat. Mi. 70.6 
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am marble-constant” (5.2.239), etc., is interrupted by an encounter with a crass peasant: the 
“clown” who brings her the asp (“worm”), and who insists on making indecorous, phallic jokes 
about “joy o’th’ worm” (5.2.278). In Julius Caesar, when Cassius kills himself, it is because his 
near-sightedness leads him to misread the outcome of a crucial battle. “Alas,” Titinius says, 
“thou hast misconstrued everything” (5.3.84). Brutus also kills himself, but only after admitting 
that he believes that suicide is intrinsically dishonourable. His death thus comes across as an 
inconsistency, an expression of weakness. It is an act that he himself calls “cowardly and vile” 
(5.1.103).
51
  
Throughout his plays, Seneca repeatedly depicts Epicurean withdrawal from ambition, 
wealth, travel, and cities as the best possible mode of life.
52
 Like Stoic suicide, Epicurean 
retirement from public life is presented as an escape from outside influence, with its attendant 
emotional distress: a retreat into a promised land of careless autonomy. The cure for the ills of 
boundless ambition is to withdraw from civilization itself: non illum avarae mentis inflammat 
furor / qui se dicavit montium insontem iugis (“no madness of greed inflames the man who 
devotes himself innocently to the high hills,” ) (486-87). Retreat from society preserves 
individual freedom, individual self-control: autarkeia. Hippolytus proclaims, non alia magis est 
libera et vitio carens / … / quam quae relictus moenibus silvas amat (“No other life is more free 
and blameless … than that which abandons city walls and loves the forests,” ) (483-85). 
Nevertheless, no prominent character in Seneca’s tragedies ever manages to shuck it all in this 
fashion, escape the entanglements of high position, and walk away from the imbroglios on-stage. 
Hippolytus attempts to do so, like Shakespeare’s Timon in Timon of Athens, or Duke Senior in 
                                      
51
 For the connection between Shakespeare’s account of Brutus’s shifting opinion about suicide and what he found 
in his main source, North’s translation of Plutarch’s Lives, see Braden (2014, 44-47).  
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 Pha. 204-15, 483-552, 1123-42; Oed. 671-7, 687-93; Med. 301-29, 608-69, 260-74; Thy. 340-470; Her. O. 125-
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As You Like It.
53
 Despite himself, however, Hippolytus is drawn back in; like Seneca himself, he 
finds himself subject, with or without his consent, to the whims and cruelty of contemporary 
court politics.
54
 The only exception might be said to be the indistinct commoners of the Chorus. 
In Thyestes, the Chorus vows that it is content with its own anonymity (391-97):   
 
 Stet quicumque volet potens 
 aulae culmine lubrico: 
 me dulcis saturet quies. 
 obscuro positus loco 
 leni perfruar otio, 
 nullis nota Quiritibus 
 aetus per tacitum fluat. 
 
Who wishes may stand in power on a palace’s slippery peak: let sweet repose sate 
me. Set in an obscure place, let me bask in gentle leisure; unknown to any 
Quirites, let my life flow on through peace. (391-7) 
 
Recalled from banishment by his brother, Thyestes himself, in keeping with the Chorus’s 
perspective, considers going back to his exile in the woods.
55
 clarus hic regni nitor / fulgore non 
est quod oculos falso auferat (“There is no reason for this bright lustre of kingship to blind your 
eyes with its false glitter,” ) (414-15). Nevertheless, he accepts his brother’s fatal invitation to 
return to court. In effect, he enacts the reverse of an Epicurean withdrawal. 
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54
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For the most part, what we find in Seneca’s tragedies is neither self-possessed Stoic 
suicide, nor its more moderate analogue, Epicurean retirement from public life, but instead, the 
same kind of all-consuming competition for political authority which Seneca repudiates, over 
and over again, as pointless and unsatisfying. The Chorus in Thyestes asks, quis vos exagitat 
furor, / alteris dare sanguinem / et sceptrum scelere aggredi? (“What is this frenzy that drives 
you to spill your blood by turns and beset the sceptre with crime?” ) (349-51). Then it launches 
into well-worn Stoic paradoxes.
56
 The true king is the Stoic sapiens, and he does not need wealth 
or military might (348-52):. 
  
  rex est qui posuit metus 
  et diri mala pectoris; 
  quem non ambitio impotens 
  et numquam stabilis faovr 
  vulgi praeceptis movet[.] 
 
A king is one who is rid of fear and the evil of an ugly heart; one that no wilful 
ambition or the ever shifting favour of the hasty mob can affect. (348-52) 
 
But is it so easy to rest content? As Phaedra’s attendant observes, quod non potest vult posse qui 
nimum potest (“he who is able to do too much wants to be able to do what he cannot do,” (215). 
 
Quisquis secundis rebus exultat nimis 
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fluitque luxu, semper insolita appetite. 
tunc illa magnae dira fortunae comes 
subit libido[.] 
 
Those who grow too extravagant through prosperity, overflowing with luxury, are 
always seeking out the unusual. Then lust creeps in, that dire companion of good 
fortune. (204-7)   
 
In the world of Senecan tragedy, almost no-one is ever content to share political power. As 
Thyestes says, non capit regnum duos (“a throne has no room for two,” ) (444). The same 
principle holds true in the domestic sphere, as well. Aegisthus warns Clytemnestra: Nec regna 
socium ferre nec taedae sciunt (“Neither thrones nor marriages can endure a partner,” ) (259). 
Wives such as Medea, Clytemnestra, and Deianira refuse to share their husband with a mistress. 
Medea is incredulous at the very idea: regias egone ut faces / inulta patiar? (“Am I to endure 
this royal marriage unavenged?” ) (398-99).  
Thus, in the world of Senecan tragedy, winning is unstable, because losers refuse to cede 
power graciously. In Troades, Ulysses recognizes the need to kill Astyanax, despite his pity for 
the boy’s mother, Andromache; otherwise, he explains, the Trojans will rise again, and the cycle 
of revenge will continue.
57
 Losers in turn fight back so tenaciously, because winners tend to 
overstep the limits of their victory, trampling the defeated beyond the bounds of endurance. In 
Troades, Pyrrhus insists on sacrificing Polyxena on the grave of his father, Achilles, despite 
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Agamemnon’s advice that they should observe more restraint in victory.58 Pyrrhus scoffs at all 
talk of moderation: quodcumque libuit facere victori licet (“The victor has a right to do whatever 
he pleases,” ) (335). Aegisthus warns Clytemnestra of her likely fate, if she allows Agamemnon 
to keep Cassandra as his consort: feresne thalami victa consortem tui? / at illa nolet. Ultimum est 
nuptae malum / palam maritam possidens paelex domum. (“Will you endure being bested and 
sharing your marriage bed? She will not! The worst disaster for a wife is to have a mistress 
openly in control of the marital household” ) (256-58). Anyone who does try to share power ends 
up vulnerable to betrayal, as in the case of Thyestes’s return; to trust a rival may seem noble 
initially, but in time proves to have been a naive misstep. 
 Shakespeare captures this sense of doomed zero-sum competition in his Roman plays in 
the rivalry between Coriolanus and Aufidius in Coriolanus, as well as that of Mark Antony and 
Octavian in Antony and Cleopatra. When Antony’s lieutenant, Enobarbus, hears that Octavian 
has imprisoned Lepidus, the third man of their triumvirate, his response is telling. “Then, world, 
thou hast a pair of chaps [i.e. jaws], no more, / And throw between them all the food thou hast, / 
They’ll grind the one the other” (3.5.13-15). Compromise is inconceivable, and defeat is 
intolerable. In Troades, Hecuba describes the murdered Priam as “blest” (felix), because he does 
not have to endure being led in triumph, and the chorus of Trojan woman assures her that they 
agree.
59
 Shakespeare’s Cleopatra inspires her attendants to join her in killing themselves by 
harping in like vein on the indignity of being displayed as a trophy. “Shall they hoist me up / 
And show me to the shouting varletry / Of censuring Rome?” (5.2.54-56) Brutus admits to 
Cassius that his desire to avoid this kind of public humiliation is the real reason why he later kills 
himself, after his defeat at Philippi. “If we lose this battle,” Cassius asks, “you are contented to 
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be led in triumph / Through the streets of Rome?” (5.1.107-9) “No, Cassius, no,” Brutus replies. 
“Think not, thou noble Roman, / That ever Brutus will go bound to Rome. / He bears too great a 
mind” (5.1.110-13). 
  “Too great a mind”: the phrase invokes Aristotle’s concept of μεγαλοψυχία, the pride of 
the “great-souled” man, and it also captures Brutus’s participation in what Braden calls 
“Senecan” or simply “classical” selfhood.60 Brutus is determined to remain “autarkic” to the end, 
author of all that happens to himself, even if that means killing himself. The same mindset drives 
the self-destructive revenge characteristic of Senecan tragedy. To commit suicide is an act of 
aggression, designed to rob the victor of some degree of agency, and to restore the dignity 
associated with that agency back to the defeated individual. Clytemnestra explains: latus 
exigatur ensis et perimat duos; / misce cruorem, perde pereundo virum: / mors misera non est 
commori cum quo velis (“The sword must be driven through your own side, if it cannot be 
otherwise, and slaughter two; mingle your blood, destroy your man by self-destruction: to die 
with someone you want to die is no wretched death,” ) (200-2).  
 Shakespeare, in contrast, and in keeping with the precepts of Christianity, sees dignity in 
accepting the limits of individual agency, as long as it is in the interests of compassion. The 
implicit model is Christ himself, who accepts the vulnerability of Incarnation, as well as the 
suffering of the Passion.
61
 The most important expression of this acceptance of intrinsic human 
weakness is forgiveness, which includes not only pardoning others, but also acknowledging and 
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making peace with one’s own particular sins and failures.62 This about-face can occur in a comic 
vein: perhaps the best example is Benedick’s final speech in Much Ado about Nothing. Benedick 
vows never to succumb to the siren call of love; never to give up his prized autonomy for the 
various indignities of marriage. Rather than admitting their obvious attraction, he and Beatrice 
persist instead in what Leonato calls “a kind of merry war” of verbal banter, taunting and 
insulting each other (1.1.55-56). The effect is a romantic variation on the more deadly 
competition at the heart of the Senecan tragic vision, an interminable conflict fuelled by pride, 
with no possible outcome other than mutual injury. By the end of the play, however, Benedick 
relents. He and Beatrice confess their feelings for each other, and he proclaims himself delighted 
to wed his quondam opponent. “In brief,” he says, “since I do purpose to marry, I will think 
nothing to any purpose that the world can say against it; and therefore never flout at me for what 
I have said against it; for man is a giddy thing, and this is my conclusion” (5.4.103-7). 
 This type of μετάνοια (“repentance,” lit., “change of mind”) appears in a more serious 
light in King Lear, as well as Shakespeare’s final tragicomedies. When he wakes up, no longer 
mad, Lear begs Cordelia for forgiveness, and admits that he is only “a very foolish, fond old 
man” (4.7.60). So, too, Leontes, when he recovers from his bout of paranoia. In the second half 
of The Winter’s Tale, Leontes accepts precisely the same kind of re-evaluation of himself which 
Eliot, at least, maintains that Othello never entirely lets himself see, even in death. He abandons 
his former delusions of omniscience, and he blames himself unequivocally for the death of his 
wife. In The Tempest, after his servant, Ariel, chides him for cruelty, Prospero decides not to 
exact any further revenge on his shipwrecked countrymen.  
                                      
62
 See Dodson-Robinson 2013, esp. 82, 90-92, and 97-100 for a reading of forgiveness in Hamlet vis-à-vis Senecan 
tragedy: “Forgiveness in Hamlet offers spiritual salvation in a materially corrupt universe. In allusive and often 
ironic ways, Christian virtues, juxtaposed with Senecan precedents, redeem ‘the primal eldest curse’ of betrayal” 
(82).   
Formatted: Font: (Default) Times
New Roman, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: (Default) Times
New Roman, 10 pt, Italic
Formatted: Font: (Default) Times
New Roman, 10 pt
Formatted: Font: (Default) Times
New Roman, 10 pt
Formatted: English (U.S.)
Gray -- 33 
 
 
 Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th’ quick 
 Yet, with my nobler reason ‘gainst my fury 
 Do I take part. The rarer action is 
 In virtue than in vengeance. (5.1.25-8) 
 
Not only does Prospero pardon his brother, Antonio, but he also gives up his god-like “rough 
magic,” not long after. This turn might seem as far from the Senecan ethos as it is possible to be. 
Miola describes it as “nothing less than a triumph over the Senecan self”: “Prospero achieves 
self-creation by self-denial rather than self-assertion, by surrender rather than conquest” (1992, 
214). 
 By the end of his career, Shakespeare stands in clear-cut opposition to classical 
admiration of human pride: Aristotle’s μεγαλοψυχία. It would be reductive, however, to say 
therefore that Shakespeare altogether rejects the moral sensibility of Senecan tragedy. He is 
sensitive to Seneca’s own ambivalence; he turns Seneca against himself. Antiheroes such as 
Medea and Atreus are only one aspect of Senecan drama. Shakespeare picks up on another side, 
as well, a sympathy and perhaps even a longing for a very different value-system, more akin to 
that of Christianity. The marked hesitation of characters such as Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, 
momentarily restrained by feelings of pity and horror, allows Seneca to articulate an alternative 
vision of morality, one in which empathy and forgiveness are paramount, even if in the end these 
characters act otherwise. Shakespeare recognizes this ambiguity and works within it to bolster 
what in Seneca’s own vision tends to appear instead only as a recessive, hypothetical 
counterpoint.  
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For example, Leontes’s repentance for his crimes against his own family is not wholly 
without precedent in Seneca’s tragedies. Shakespeare appropriates and adapts the end of 
Seneca’s Hercules Furens, when Hercules accepts that he must learn from his foster-father, 
Amphitryon, how to forgive himself. Another example is the similarity between the resolution of 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and the point at which Seneca breaks off his possibly-unfinished 
tragedy, Phoenissae. At the abrupt close, the two brothers, Polynices and Eteocles, still smoulder 
with hatred for each other. It seems inevitable that they will resume their struggle for power. 
Nevertheless, taking the play as it is, it ends with Jocasta having established peace in Thebes. 
Her feminine compassion for both parties proves more powerful, more dignified, even if only 
temporarily, than their spiteful ambition for individual imperium. 
 Shakespeare ends Coriolanus with an analogous reconsideration of the possible dignity 
of compassion, forgiveness, and feminine weakness. Volumnia’s ability to evoke Coriolanus’s 
pity spares Rome from being sacked; as with Jocasta in Phoenissae, her intervention proves far 
more effective than the use of brute force. Coriolanus vows, “all the swords / In Italy and her 
confederate arms / Could not have made this peace” (5.3.207-9). “Ladies,” he says, “you deserve 
/ To have a temple built you” (5.3.206-7). And in fact, his mother, Volumnia, and his wife, 
Virgilia, do re-enter Rome in triumph. Menenius proclaims, “This Volumnia / Is worth of 
consuls, senators, patricians, / A city full” (5.4.53-55).   
Coriolanus’s change of heart does lead to his death. Nevertheless, the same etiolated pity 
which leads him to abandon his march on Rome, and which he sees as a shameful weakness, 
appears in contrast to the audience as his most attractive quality. As A. D. Nuttall writes about 
Brutus, “his love for his wife and his grief at her death, ‘affections’ which Brutus is proud to be 
able to repress, actually redeem him as a human being” (2007, 185). The same kind of analysis 
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might well be applied to Seneca himself. He is redeemed, in Shakespeare’s eyes, by his own 
philosophical inconsistencies. Shakespeare discerns Seneca’s doubts about his sense of human 
dignity, and he expands those misgivings into a comprehensive and more hopeful vision of an 
alternative ethical universe: the moral world of Christianity. 
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